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Volume XXXIX JANUARY, 1935 Number 2
SUPREME COURT OPINIONS OF JUSTICE
KEPHART
WILLIAM C. PETTIT*
Almost twenty-one years have elapsed since Judge (now Mr. Justice)
Kephart wrote his first opinion for the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.' Since
that time, in addition to his Superior Court opinions, he has written more than
seven hundred opinions as a member of the Supreme Court. Not only his
long period of service on the appellate courts of the state but also his mastery
of many distinct phases of the law and a zeal in a humane tempering of
justice make it fitting to consider the opinions he has announced.
Study of the work of the Supreme Court cannot but impress upon one
the fact that law is touched with relatively few personalities. This ought not
prevent some comment upon the work of men who ably interpret and expound
the law. In the pattern of decisions that the court has wrought, the force of
Justice Kephart's judicial reasoning can never go unnoticed, In the realm of
equity, that broad field of jurisprudence correcting that "wherein the law (by
reason of its universality) is deficient,"'2 he demonstrates a mastery of the art
of weighing good faith and applying laches. Including his Orphans' Court
opinions, as it is only right to do, we find that his equity opinions far out-
number any other single type of opinion.5 The judicial career of the former
Cambria county lawyer bids fair to become also that of a noted chancellor.
Yet he is, withal, a learned law judge holding the common law to be not a
fixed, unyielding set of principles but a law which "adapts itself to changing
conditions as marked by the progress of public, material and social affairs."'
*A.B.. University of Pittsburgh. 1929; LL.B., University of Pittsburgh Law School, 1933;
Editor, the Pitt Weekly, 1927-29; sometime president. National College Press Association;
member Allegheny County Bar and the Pennsylvania Bar.
'Shaffer v. Bahr, 57 Pa. Super. Ct. 48 (1914). Probably the most famous of his Super-
ior Court opinions was Ben Avon Borough v. Ohio Valley Water Co., 68 Pa. Super. Ct. 561
(1917). His statement of the rules for determining present value for purposes of utility rate-
making were considered favorably by the United States Supreme Court. See Ohio Valley
Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 (1920).
2Blackstone, quoting Grotius' De Aequitate, paragraph 3.
8His opinions in negligence cases are next most numerous.
'Neabit v. Rlesenman, 298 Pa. 475 (1930).
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What has been said of the life of Mr. Justice Brandeis might be applied
to the career of Justice Kephart, namely, that no change from forum to bench
came with greater ease.' This was due to a seasoned and diversified experi-
ence in a work-a-day world, so essential for the man whose work on the
bench is to live. After a dozen years of private practice, he went to a county
solicitorship and subsequently ascended the bench for the first time in 1914.
He has written:
"I believe it absolutely and essentially necessary, for the integrity
of the police force of any municipality, that the chief police officer should
have a liberal disciplinary control over his men; but it should be only a
disciplinary control. Especially should it not be a power that might be
subverted to evil influences surrounding his office, or that could be made
the tool of oppression either for personal or political ends.""
. .under the rule now laid down, a husband may
easily defeat the claim of his wife after his death even to the extent of
making her a pauper, and she has no redress no matter how just or
meritorious her claim. It is no answer to say that a fair-minded hus-
band would not do this; it should not be possible for any husband to do
it." 7
"Section 10 reposes an autocratic power in the insurance commis-
sioner. He may not only investigate, but he may also determine
whether liquidation or closing shall take place. This
section of the act so flagrantly violates the due process clause and our
Bill of Rights that no defense can be made for it."8
"The act is, therefore, socialistic. If the act is not opposed to any
constitutional barrier, this reason cannot appeal to us. ....
"While there are many cases of property damage due to subsid-
ences, and people located thereabouts have been permitted to suffer be-
cause of what was then, and is now declared to be, a mistaken idea as
to the power of an individual to sell property without surface support,
yet that was the Commonwealth's blunder, and the Commonwealth
should pay for its mistakes from general funds or use for this purpose
the money now to be received from taxes on this very coal." 1°
"What reasonable relation has the set-back line or space in front
of houses in ordinary residence districts, to the health, safety, or morals
of the community? To bring this, and other like regula-
545 Harvard Law R. 38.
8McCoach v. Philadelphia, 273 Pa. 317 (dissent) (1922).
TBeirne v. Cont., Equitable Co., 307 Pa. 570 (dissent) (1932).
aNational Automobile Corp. v. Barford, 289 Pa. 307 (1927).
oBusser v. Snyder, 282 Pa. 440 (1925).
I.Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 274 Pa. 489 (1922).
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tions, under the police power, would be to sweep away constitutional
guarantees on the ownership of property. It is regulation run mad.",-,
These excerpts give some clue to the judicial philosophy of the man. His
opinions contain few of the "epigrammatic thrusts" of a Holmes. Justice
Kephart relies as little on powerful exposition to reach demonstrable truth as
he does on the marshalling of facts, His style of writing is cooly logical, al-
most curt at times. 2 With short, simple sentences, he details facts of cases,
states arguments of counsel before the court, and then proceeds to affirm or
disaffirm them. Rarely are his opinions verbose; many of them are only
three or four pages in length.12 Yet he has the distinction of writing one of
the longest opinions of the court in recent years.* In sustaining the Talbot
act of 1931 appropriating money to the Department of Welfare for state aid
for care of the poor, he wrote an opinion thirty-five pages long dealing with
many questions of constitutional law.'4
The Supreme Court had construed important sections of the Workmen's
Compensation Act of 1915 in relatively few cases before Justice Kephart was
elected to the court in 1918. As a member of the Superior Court, he had
heard some, and written opinions in a few, compensation cases. His first
opinion in this branch of the law was rendered December 13, 1917.15 His
many opinions dealing with the rights of workmen show Justice Kephart's
familiarity with the compensation law of Pennsylvania. A number of import-
ant decisions construing that act have been made by the Supreme Court in
opinions by Justice Kephart. Less than four years after the court held the
act to be constitutional,"e he wrote the opinion construing the word "con-
tractor" and permitting the employee of a sub-subcontractor to sue the prin-
cipal contractor.' 7
In two subsequent cases, post, he discussed in extenso the rights and
liabilities of employer and employee and helped to a great extent to clarify
and interpret the act of 1915. Thus in Gallivan v. Wark Co.," he upheld the
right of the employee of a sub-contractor to sue the principal contractor not-
withstanding the fact that the employee had received compensation from his
immediate employer. In Zimmer v. Casey.1 9 his opinion again dealt with
lWhite's Appeal, 287 Pa. 259 (1926).
12"Counsel there as here sought to impale the decision on the name public garage' and
what it means. We did not enjoin a name; what was enjoined was the use of building under
given conditions in a residential neighborhood." Ladner v. Siegel, 296 Pa. 579 (1929).
IsHis shortest opinion is Kahn v. Quaker City Cab Co., 264 Pa. 510 (1919), one page
long, citing no cases.
-Commonwealth v. Liveright, 308 Pa. 35 (1932).
l8Hennessey v. U. S. Repair Co., 68 Pa. Super. Ct. 553 (1917).
16Anderson v. Carnegie Steel Co., 255 Pa. 33 (1916).
llQualp v. James Stewart Co., 266 Pa. 502 (1920).
18288 Pa. 443 (1927).
19296 Pa. 529 (1929).
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compensation, injuries and the common law liability of employers and em-
ployees, holding that compensated employees injured through negligence of
co-workers may still sue as at common law to redress their rights against said
co-employees. He has so interpreted the act that the statement, "elective
compensation (is) to take care of injured employees in a material way," has
become a fact.
"In determining liability under the Workmen's Compensation Law," he
wrote fourteen years ago, "we must be guided by the clear intendment of
the act as expressed by the words and definitions there used; if prior judicial
decisions tend to limit or curtail the effect of words and phrases that are used
with a certain meaning defined by the act, the legal rules announced by such
decisions must give way to what the lawmaking body prescribed the use and
meaning of the words to be.
' '
20
In the field of constitutional law, Justice Kephart has written many import-
ant opinions for the court. Especially is this true in regard to the power and
manner of the legislature to appropriate money as controlled by Article III,
section 18 of the Constitution: "No appropriations shall be
made for charitable, educational or benevolent purposes, to any person or
community, nor to any denominational or sectarian institution, corporation or
association." To the interpretation of this clause he has addressed himself.
Thus in Busser v,. Snyder,21 the first old age pension case, it was argued that
the phrase "to any person or community" had a restricted meaning, hence
pension money could be given to old persons as a class. Justice Kephart,
writing the opinion of the court, said :
"This contention is not sound; 'person' and 'community' are not
limited to the idea of a single person or place where persons are located;
they are used in an inclusive sense, relating to an individual or a group
or class of persons, wherever situated, in any part or all of the Com-
monwealth. It applies to persons, kind, class and place, without
qualification. The language of the Constitution is an absolute and gen-
eral prohibition. What the Constitution prohibits is the
establishment of any such policy which causes an appropriation of state
moneys for benevolent purposes to a particular class of its citizens,
whether under the guise of an agency, as an arm of the government
through which a system is created, or directly to an individual."
It was this opinion that declared the first old age assistance act unconstitu-
tional.
Again in Collins v. Martin,2 2 in passing upon the validity of the act of
2OQualp v. James Stewart Co., supra.
21282Pa. 440 (1925).
22290 Pa. 388 (1927).
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1925 2 appropriating one million dollars to the Department of Welfare to pay
for the treatment of the indigent sick in hospitals not owned by the Common-
wealth, the above section was considered by Justice Kephart. It was con-
tended that the care of indigent sick is a governmental function and an ap-
propriation to enable the performance of that function cannot be classed as
being one for a charitable purpose, even though worked out through a sectar-
ian institution. While such activity, Justice Kephart wrote, may "assume
the form of a governmental function or duty, of which we shall speak later,"
such activity does not lose its chief characteristic, viz, the state's work of
charity. He wrote:
"There should be no doubt as to the comprehensiveness of this pro-
vision in the Constitution. It states in short (and this is the real thought
underlying the constitutional provision) that the people's money shall
not be given for charity, benevolence or education to persons or com-
munities, or for any purpose to sectarian and denominational institu-
tions, corporations, or associations. This mandate comes direct from
the people. It is placed on those in authority, to be followed without
exception or reservation of any character. . . It is an exemplar
of one of the most fundamental concepts of our government."
In the decision, supra, sustaining the Talbot Act which appropriated ten mil-
lion dollars to the Department of Welfare for payment to political subdivisions
to care for the poor, this section of the Constitution was again considered.
It was said that counties or poor districts, which received the money must be
classed as communities; that an appropriation to be used in the discretion of
such recipients is an appropriation for a charitable or benevolent purpose.
Writing the opinion of the majority of the court, Justice Kephart said:
"Having twice decided that appropriations to perform obligatory
public duties or functions are not charities or benevolences, we again
hold that the State, in performance of its governmental duty to take
care of the poor, is not forbidden by Article I1, section 18, either direct-
ly to assume this obligation, or to permit and aid one of its subsidiaries
of government to perform it, or to have it performed by an institution
not forbidden by the Constitution. As long as these channels are kept
clear, constitutional inhibitions will not disturb such acts."
When the legislature by act of 1931, P. L. 106 made an appropriation to the
Department of Welfare for the maintenance of certain hospitals, naming them
and the amounts to be received, Justice Kephart wrote a dissenting opinion,
contending that such act violated Article I1, section 3 of the Constitution.,-
He there said:
23Appropriation Act, April 13, 1925, p. 159.
24Constitutional Defense League v. Waters, 309 Pa. 545 (1932).
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"Article III, section 15, of the Constitution provides: 'The general
appropriation bill shall embrace nothing but appropriations for the
ordinary expenses of the executive, legislative and judicial departments
of the Commonwealth . . . . all other appropriations shall be
made by separate bills, each embracing but one subject.'
"The act under consideration does make one hundred seventy dis-
tinct and independent appropriations by one bill, which embraces one
hundred and seventy different subjects of appropriations, namely money
to be paid different hospitals. . . . To uphold (the act) is not
to construe but to rewrite this section of the Constitution.
' '
25
An exhaustive opinion reviewing the law on third party beneficiary con-
tracts is his opinion in Greene County v. Southern Surety Co.2' He there held
that though creditor beneficiaries cannot recover on a contract to which they
are not parties, a donee beneficiary may recover where the consideration for
the promise is transfer of property or money to the promisor or where unusual
circumstances are present.
2 7
In two important cases dealing with constitutional law, Justice Kephart's
opinions have been considered by the United States Supreme Court. In
Commonwealth u. Di Santo,28 the state Supreme Court upheld the right of the
state by act of legislature to regulate the business of selling steamship tickets.
This decision was later reversed by a decision of the federal Supreme Court,
three justices dissenting.2 9 The opinion written by Justice Kephart, though
reversed on appeal, found favor with Justices Holmes. Brandeis and Stone.
"If Pennsylvania must submit to seeing its citizens defrauded, it is not because
Congress has so willed but because the Constitution so commands. I cannot
believe that it does," wrote Justice Brandeis.-0
In 1921, the legislature passed the Kohler Act3 regulating the mining of
anthracite coal. This act made it unlawful "so to conduct the operation of
25Other opinions of his dealing with questions of constitutional law are: Tucker's Appeal,
271 Pa. 462 (1921); Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 274 Pa. 448 (1922) (dissent); White's
Appeal. 287 Pa. 259 (1926); Cameron's Account, 287 Pa. 560 (1926) (dissent); Highland v.
Russell Co., 288 Pa. 230 (1927); National Automobile Corp. v. Barford, 289 Pa. 307 (1927);
Commonwealth v. Widowich, 295 Pa. 311 (1929); Clark's Case, 301 Pa. 321 (1930); Com-
monwealth v. Central R. R. Co,, 308 Pa. 274 (1932) (dissent); Soldiers & Sailors Memorial
Bridge, 308 Pa. 487 (1932).
26292 Pa. 304 (1927).
2rSee Commonwealth v. Great Amer. Indemnity Co., 312 Pa. 183 (1933) overruling the
Greene County case. "It is to be regretted that this determination by the Court has been
reached only after so many cases have been decided on the authority of the Greene County
case," said Justice Kephart in the former case.
28285 Pa. 1 (1925).
29Di Santo v. Commonwealth, 273 U. S. 34 (1927).
300p. cit.
alMay 21. 1921, P. L. 1198.
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mining anthracite coal as to cause the caving-in" of buildings, notwithstand-
ing the fact that right of surface support had been waived. Justice Kephart's
dissent from the decision of the court upholding the validity of the act is a
moving and forceful opinion.3 2 The majority opinion was, he felt, "a long
stride in the development of the law of police power. . . . The logical
result of the majority opinion will go far to bring about the condition so
earnestly longed for by those advocating equalization of property." The
act, he wrote, transferred from its owners a property right (already paid for)
-the right to remove coal supporting surface areas. His lone dissent was
not a voice crying in the wilderness. A majority of the Supreme Court of
the United States agreed with his dissent."s Said Justice Holmes: "It is our
opinion that the act cannot be sustained as an exercise of the police power.
The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."
The court's three most recent cases dealing with use of injunctions in
labor disputes have resulted in opinions by Justice Kephart. His concurring
opinion in Kraemer Hosiery Co. v. Am. F. Workers34 is a quasi-dissent from
a majority of the court which in its opinion had approved an injunction for-
bidding defendants "from picketing plaintiff's plant in combination with
others, for the purpose of inducing or attempting to induce employes ....
to become connected with" the union. The evidence showed mass picketing,
annoyance, "opprobrious and vile expressions to those who remained at
work," and violence. Recognizing that "these were not peaceable acts of
persuasion which labor organizations may use to secure members," he felt that
such acts should be restrained. But a sweeping injunction was not to his
liking. "I would modify the injunction," he wrote, "so as to restrain appel-
lant from committing any of the acts which I have described as being unlaw-
ful."
The right of labor to picket peacefully as stated in dicta of the Supreme
Court in the Kraemer case, supra, and in Jefferson 6 Indiana Coal Co. v.
Marks-5 is squarely upheld by Justice Kephart in Kirmse v. Adler.36 Writing
the opinion of the court, he felt that "picketing, if peaceful and unaccompanied
by coercion, duress, or intimidation, is lawful." F. thermore, employees of
a plant have an "unquestioned right to present their case to the public in
newspapers or circulars in a peaceful way." Is the court impliedly sustaining
boycotts? Much depends on what the court finds to be the facts. "The con-
trolling factor," wrote Justice Kephart, "must be, do the methods used involve
intimidation or coercion in any form?" The purpose of the union in this case,
32Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., supra note 10.
33Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393 (1922).
84305 Pa. 206 (1931).
36287 Pa. 171 (1926).
86311 Pa. 78 (1933).
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through the acts complained of, was to secure work for union men even
though it resulted in discharge of nonunion men. This was not an unlawful
purpose, he felt.
Justice Kephart would view with alarm a too ready use of injunctions as
a method of settling labor troubles. "This court . . . . in consider-
ing them has never impressed thei strong arm of an equitable injunction unless
the circumstances imperatively required it,""7 Such a view is an expression
of his critical liberalism. It is in accord with the rational, modern view of a
man who feels that social progress "must and will break through any judicially
established principle, as it must and will break through any law that impedes
its natural growth."38
37Kirmse v. Adler, supra.
-8Burke v. Hollinger, 296 Pa. 510 (1929).
